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SEABOARD FINANCE CO. V. DAVIS
A NEW APPROACH TO
THE APPLICATION OF ERIE

-

Plaintiff, Seaboard Finance Co., loaned $35,000 to the defendants and received their executed promissory note and the

stock of National Tours, Inc. as security for the debt.1 When
financial reports were not furnished as required by the loan
agreement and when payments on the loan were not made, Seaboard filed an action on the promissory note in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles seeking recovery on the loan. 2 The defendants appeared and answered. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff
filed the present diversity action, 3 alleging that material misrepresentations by the defendants in inducing the loan had damaged plaintiff in the amount of $45,000. It was the contention
of Seaboard that false statements, written and oral, were made

by the defendants concerning the financial condition of National
Group Plan, Inc., doing business as National Tours. It was
further claimed that the defendants knew that bankruptcy, vol4
untary or involuntary, was likely if not imminent.

Arguing that the application of section 48(1) (c) of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act5 was required according to the Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkin@s doctrine, defendant, Davis, filed a
motion to dismiss. 7 Dismissal was sought not under federal law

as an exercise of discretion based on federal-state comity, but
rather under state law as a mandatory requirement of the policy
' Defendants, George Davis, George Patterson and Joan M. Patterson,
were the sole stockholders and the principal officers of National Tours, Inc.
2 Civil No. 904867 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal., filed Mar. 3,
1967).
3 Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
4 In fact involuntary bankruptcy did occur. See In re Nat'l Group Plan,
Inc., No. 66B9276 (N.D. Ill., E.D. filed Dec. 1, 1966).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §48 (1) (c) (1967), which provides in part:
(1) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion
for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of
the following grounds.
(c) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7Defendant in Seaboard filed his motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) which provides in part:
[T]hat the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. ...
The motion attacked the jurisdiction of the court alleging a lack of complete diversity of citizenship. After examining the affidavits of the parties,
the court stated:
rD]efendant's presence in California on the date of the commencement
of the action is ...

[a] dispute.

.. . involv[ing] a question of fact which

cannot be properly resolved without a hearing at which relevant evidence can be heard and weighed.
276 F. Supp. at 511.
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and theory of Erie.8 The court, while recognizing that the defendant's motion 9 presented a situation which "obviously calls
for a result which is contrary to the current federal practice," 10
held that Erie required application of state law which made dismissal mandatory.

In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the history
of Erie and subsequent decisions to determine what tests were
to be applied.

In 1789, Congress passed the Rules of Decision Act 1 which
was to govern the question of what state law should be applied
when a federal court exercises jurisdiction over a non-federal

claim. The problem was the meaning of the word "laws."
Were the federal courts to apply state decisional law, just the
statutory law, or both? In Swift v. Tyson,1 2 the United States
Supreme Court, in an attempt to achieve "uniformity of law
throughout the United States,"' 1 construed the Act to be "limited [in] its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say,
to the positive statutes of the State, and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals...

.1.4

The effect of this decision

was to allow the federal courts in a diversity action to determine
the general common law in the absence of local laws or positive
statutes on the particular subject before them, and in so doing
escape application of state law. More importantly, because the
general common law, as interpreted by the federal courts, varied
according to the court where the action was brought, the goal

of diversity jurisdiction, prevention of discrimination in the
application of state law between citizen and non-citizen, 5 went
8 See

text at notes 17-23 infra.
9It should be noted, as it was by the court, that the motion called for
dismissal and not for abatement. In the normal situation of a prior pending action and a subsequent federal suit involving the same parties and issues, the federal courts may proceed concurrently (usual occurrence) or invoke their discretionary power and stay the federal proceedings (rare).
See Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684 (1960). It appears that the
only time that the courts have the power to dismiss is in actions for declaratory judgment, and then only because of the special nature of the
court's jurisdiction. See 6 J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.08 (2d ed. 1966).
10 276 F. Supp. at 512.
11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §34, 1 Stat. 92 (now 28 U.S.C. §1652),
which provided:
[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
1241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
13 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938).
1A441 U.S. at 18.
For a discussion of the intent of the drafters of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 see Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1933). Warren argues
that it was the intention of the first congress to include state decisional law
as well as statutory law. Id. at 82-83. But see Teton, The Story of Swift
v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REV. 519 (1941).
15 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
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unrealized. As a consequence of application of differing rules
of law in the two court systems, the practice of forum shopping
within a state developed. 16
In Erie RailroadCo. V. Tompkins," the Supreme Court overruled Swift and its doctrine of non-application of state decisional
law, holding that the law to be applied in any case, except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, is the law of the state. Tompkins, a resident of Pennsylvania, was injured in that state, and subsequently instituted
a diversity action for damages in a New York district court
against the Erie Railroad, a New York corporation. The defendant appealed the district court's decision in favor of plaintiff, contending that Pennsylvania law, 18 which imposed a lesser
standard of care, should have applied. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "whether the federal court
was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law."' 9 The conflict was between state substantive law,
a willful and wanton standard, and federal substantive law,
a standard of ordinary care. The Court held that the federal
courts could not disregard state decisional law and that state
substantive law must be applied where jurisdiction is based upon
diversity of citizenship. The reasons for the decision, as advanced by Justice Brandeis, were the previous misinterpretation
of the Rules of Decision Act and the desire for uniformity in
treatment of litigants by both judicial systems within a state.
Implicit in both these reasons are certain constitutional commands. The first concerns the allocation of power between the
state and federal legislative and judicial systems. The argument
is that neither Congress nor the federal courts may declare rules
infringing upon substantive rights of citizens in an area which
is not governed by an express grant of federal authority.20 The
16

The goal of forum shopping is to reach a result in the federal court

unobtainable in the state court either by originally filing a diversity action
in, or by removing a state action to, the federal court. The practice of
forum shopping, after the decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), developed primarily because of the divergence between local and
federal rule and because of the extensions of the doctrine of general common law. For the most flagrant example of forum shopping see Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1927).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a comprehensive collection of articles, comments and notes on the Erie subject see 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
%0.304 (2d ed. 1965).
18 Under Pennsylvania law "persons who use pathways along the
railroad right of way ... are to be deemed trespassers; and ... the railroad

is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful." 304 U.S. at 70.
19 304 U.S. at 71.

20 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the
States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution
specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the au-
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federal government, one of limited powers, is confined to those
activities specifically provided for in the Constitution. 21 It is
not within that limited power to prescribe the substantive law
applicable in diversity cases where the federal court is but another court of the state. Embodied in the second reason, the
uniformity in treatment of litigants, is the doctrine of equal
protection of the law. 22 The reasoning here is that all litigants
within a state should be entitled to the same treatment by the
courts located in that state regardless of which judicial system
2
is chosen as the forum. 3
Erie's state substance-federal procedure rule was a result
of both of the above constitutional principles. The substanceprocedure distinction was further solidified by the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Prior to this, the
various acts of Congress had required that the federal courts
in law actions, as opposed to equity actions, conform to state
procedural rules.2 4 The new rules combined law and equity
pleadings and eliminated much confusion that had previously
existed. The Rules Enabling Act,25 the basis of the new procedural rules, had been passed in 1934 with the admonition that
the "rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 2 6 This was the standard against
which the validity of the new rules was hereafter to be measured.
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has attempted
to clarify Erie and to determine what tests should be used in
deciding whether to apply federal or state law in a diversity
case. In 1941, the court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 2 7 applied
the substance versus procedure test in the first Supreme Court,
thority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.'
Id. at 79.
21

U.S. CONST.

amend. X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . .nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
23 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizen against
citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the
doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the
doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of
the State.
Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added).
24 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS §61 (1963).
25 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651,
§1, 48 Stat. 1064 (now 28 U.S.C.
§2072).
26 Id.
27312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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post-federal rules application of Erie. This action was brought
in a district court in Illinois to recover damages for injuries sustained in Indiana. The defendant moved for an order requiring
the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination as provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The plaintiff contended
that Illinois law governed and under it such an order would be
void. The district court disagreed, and the plaintiff, refusing to
submit to a physical examination, was held in contempt of court.
In Sibbach, an express federal rule and a state decisional
rule were, on their face, in conflict. The reasons for these rules
were, likewise, in conflict, the federal rule being grounded on a
desire to foster speedy, efficient trials, while the state rule was
premised on a right to be free from bodily invasions. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the substance versus procedure test ennunciated in Erie, holding that the express federal
rule was applicable inasmuch as it did not abridge plaintiff's
29
substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 3 0 the Supreme Court substituted the rationale of the substance versus procedure test in
Erie for the rule itself. York, representing similarly situated
bondholders, brought a class action in equity against Guaranty
Trust, alleging breach of trust in failing to protect the interests
of the noteholders and in not disclosing its conflicting interest
to the bondholders. The district court granted Guaranty Trust's
motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
a federal equity court could apply laches, rather than being
bound by the state statute of limitations as was contended by
Guaranty Trust. 1 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed8 2 stating:
The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the
State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter
of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem,
namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in38an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State
court?
Thus, if the application of state law would significantly affect
the outcome of the litigation, it, rather than the federal law, was
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
It should be noted that while at that time, Indiana
law provided for physical examinations, Illinois decisions did not permit
them.
29 Cf. with note 46 infra.
30 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

31 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 143 F.2d 503 (2d. Cir. 1944).
32 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
33 Id. at 109. This is really substance versus procedure analysis in
theory while outcome in form. It is an attempt to further the Erie policy
of uniformity of treatment of litigants within a state.
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to be applied to insure uniformity in the two judicial systems
34
within a state.

The situation in York is unique and deserving of special consideration. Initially, there is a literal conflict between the state's
statute of limitations requiring mandatory dismissal and the
federal rule of laches which leaves dismissal to the discretion of

the court. However, upon exercise of the discretion, the conflict
may be mooted in that if the federal court decides to bar the
action the result so obtained is identical to the result obtained

by application of the state statute of limitations.

On the other

hand, if the federal court in the exercise of its discretion allows

the suit to continue, the federal-state conflict then becomes unavoidable.

In resolving this conflict, in York, the federal court

considered the federal-state policy factor, uniformity of result
within a state, as the decisive factor and, hence applied the state
rule.
For 13 years there was little variance from the emphasis

on outcome determinative considerations.".5 , Then in Byrd V.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-operative, Inc.3 6 a new approach
to the Erie problem was mentioned wherein the previous reliance

on outcome-determinative analysis37 was limited by countervailing federal considerations. The problem confronting the Court
was whether a question of fact, plaintiff's status as an employee
under the state workmen's compensation act, should be tried to
a judge in accordance with state law or to a jury in accordance
with federal law. The Court held that the mere fact that the
state rule was not substantive was not dispositive of the matter.
It may well be that in the instant ...
case the outcome would be
substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided
by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were 'outcome' the only considera34 The Court seemed to ignore the fact that the state statute of limitations could have been held controlling by looking to the substantive purpose
of the statute.
13 In 1949 three diversity cases dealing with the application of Erie
were handed down on the same day. In each case, the composition of the
majority differed which is illustrative of the complex problems that faced
the Court. In the first, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530 (1949), a suit for damages was filed in federal court. It was conceded that if Kansas law were applicable, then, the action would be barred
by the statute of limitations. The question was whether, for purposes of
determining the running of a state statute, an action was commenced by
serving the defendant as provided by state law or, by filing the complaint
as provided by federal law. The Court held state law controlling. In the
second suit, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), the Court
held that where a state statute prevents non-registered foreign corporations,
doing business within that state, from maintaining a suit, then so must the
federal courts. Finally in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Fin. Co., 337 U.S. 545
(1949), the plaintiff brought a stockholder's derivative action in federal
court. The Court held that the suit was barred from the federal court unless
the plaintiff complied with the state statute requiring the posting of security
for the corporation's litigation expenses.
36 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
37 See text at notes 30-34 supra.
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tion, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court
should follow the state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. . . . The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York supra,
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule . . . which
disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge
and jury.38
The Byrd Court thus foundthat a competing federal interest the seventh amendment right to jury trial 39 - would transcend
the consideration of uniformity, hence the federal law should
apply.
The Byrd case is interesting because of the problem it poses
between theoretical and practical considerations. In this situation, the literal conflict between the federal and state rules may,
upon application, disappear. Theoretically, there is little reason
to support a distinction between judge and jury as equally able
triers of fact. Conceptually, the trier of fact, be it judge or
jury, should reach the same results. However, in practice, it
cannot be denied that in a particular situation there may be a
difference in result depending upon whom decides the issues of
fact. The Byrd Court, apparently not concerning itself with
such distinctions, decided the case on seventh amendment policy
considerations.
The latest Supreme Court consideration of the Erie doctrine
was Hanna v. Plumer.40 This case arose out of a conflict between federal rule 4(d) (1)41 permitting "abode" service, and
the Massachusetts statute4 2 requiring "in hand" service for probate claims. The district court, on motion of defendant, dismissed the action for failure to comply with the state rule. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the state statute was substantive.4 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the application of rule 4(d) (1) in this case did not conflict with
the policies of the Erie doctrine, which were identified as discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.4 4 The import of the decision is that
the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not controlled by the Erie doctrine. When the command of a federal
legislative rule is clear, the validity of that command is to be
tested not by the Erie doctrine but by the constitutional power
of Congress to prescribe federal rules of procedure and by the
38 356 U.S. at 537-38.
"'9 U.S.

CONST. amend. VII.

40 380 U.S. 460 (1965).

41 FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1).
42 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 197, §9 (1958).
43 Hanna v. Plumer,
44 380 U.S. at 468.

331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
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meaning of the Enabling Act, 45 through which Congress has
exercised that power. Hanna thus narrowed Erie's policy of
uniform treatment of litigants within a state by requiring supremacy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Justice Harlan, concurring, disagreed with the reasoning of
the majority opinion because of the lack of weight given by the
majority to the "State's substantive regulation of the primary

conduct and affairs of its citizens.146

He also disagreed with

the majority's interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act's standard for determining the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Whereas the unadulterated outcome and forum-shopping tests may
err too far towards honoring state rules, I submit that the Court's
'arguably procedural, ergo constitutional' test moves too fast and
7
far in the other direction4

The peculiarity of Hanna is that while it seems to present
a conflict, both literally and in application, between the state
and federal rules, it is very difficult to find a sufficient difference
in purpose to justify the application of one rule rather than the
other. Both are reasonably calculated to apprise the representative of claims against the estate. Yet, the Hanna Court held
that the application of the federal rules was mandatory.
45 The Rules Enabling Act, Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §1, 48 Stat.
1064 (now 28 U.S.C. §2072), contained a limitation on the power to prescribe
new rules. The limitation was based on the theory that Congress may not
interfere with areas reserved to the states.
46 380 U.S. at 476.
It has been suggested that the real way to evaluate
substance versus procedure is not to take a mechanical approach.
The words 'procedure' and 'substance' are not self-defining, and, it
can be shown, have been given varying meanings by courts dealing with
problems in different fields. As underlying social policy varies, so does
the meaning of the term.
[An 'analytic determination' cannot be made by an attempt to analyze
in vacuo 'the meaning' of the words 'procedure' and 'substance'; it can
be made only by determining what meaning the ambiguous words in
the statute ought to have to carry out the purpose in view.
W. W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
188-89 (1942).
47 380 U.S. at 476. Justice Harlan's opinion in Hanna indicates that in
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), he
would have held the federal' rule applicable.
At most, application of the Federal Rule would have meant that potential Kansas tort defendants would have to defer for a few days the
satisfaction of knowing that they had not been sued within the limitations period. The choice of the Federal Rule would have had no effect
on the primary stages of private activity from which torts arise, and
only the most minimal effect on behavior following the commission of
the tort.
380 U.S. at 477. But in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Fin. Co., 337 U.S. 545
(1949), Justice Harlan, as he indicated in Hanna, would have barred the
suit.
The proper view of Cohen is, in my opinion, that the statute was meant
to inhibit small stockholders from instituting 'strike suits,' and thus it
was designed and could be expected to have a substantial impact on
private primary activity. Anyone who was at the trial bar during the
period when Cohen arose can appreciate the strong state policy reflected in the statute.
380 U.S. at 477.
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After reviewing the cases, from Swift to Hanna, the court
in Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis48 stated:
To summarize, Erie and its progeny normally require a federal
court to apply the law of the forum state. In determining the applicability of the state law, a federal court is required to consider
three factors: (1) whether the variance between the state and local
rule is such that it will affect the outcome of the litigation; (2)
whether the variance is of a nature that it would encourage forum
shopping; and (3) whether there is some countervailing federal
consideration which would justify the variance. Where a substantial variance exists, the court must balance the first two factors
against the third. Only if the countervailing considerations outweigh the possibilities of divergent administration of
the laws and
49
forum shopping, should the federal rule be applied.
Applying these factors to the Seaboard facts, the court concluded that "there is a material difference in result between
the two systems of courts [and] [t] his variance is also of such a
nature as to encourage forum shopping." 50 The court then looked
for a countervailing federal consideration to justify the variance,
and finding none, held that the Illinois law must apply.
Thus, the Seaboard court determined that three factors
should be considered to resolve the federal-state procedural rule
conflict: first, will the conflict affect the outcome of the litigation; second, will the conflict, assuming that it affects the outcome, encourage forum shopping; and third, will the conflict,
assuming that it affects the outcome so as to encourage forum
shopping, be outweighed by affirmative countervailing federal
interests.51 The second factor, forum shopping, is in reality the
reason underlying the outcome-determinative test of the first
factor.5 2 It is here, however, made a separate and independent
factor in that it determines whether the variance in result is
substantial.
Application of the three Seaboard factors to the facts of
the cases which the Seaboard opinion reviewed indicates the
complexity involved in the choice of federal-state procedural law
in diversity cases. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,.y a personal injury action was filed in a district court in Illinois, the injury
having occurred in Indiana. Illinois law did not permit the defendant to compel the physical examination 54 of the plaintiff,
48

276 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1967).

49 Id. at 515.
50 Id.at 516.
51 Id. at 515.

52 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). It is only the unfairness which results from the opportunity of some litigants to choose advantageously between the two court systems applying different law that
fosters the objection to forum shopping. There is no suggestion that forum
shopping for any other purpose is improper.
53312 U.S. 1 (1941).
54

A physical examination is now provided for in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 110A, §215 (1967).
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while federal law did so permit.5 5 It can readily be seen that,
depending upon the outcome of the examination, such a conflict
might significantly affect the outcome of the litigation assuming
that the suit had to be filed in Illinois. Here, plaintiff chose the
federal court as the forum. This choice would generally not be
to a plaintiff's advantage with respect to the physical examination rule; plaintiff's choice of forum in reality was based on the
necessity of obtaining service. Thus, under these- particular circumstances, the variance in results would not encourage forum
shopping. So concluding, the three factor analysis of Seaboard
need not go any further, and the federal rule must be applied.
On the other hand, where it is the defendant who is dictating
the choice of forum, by removing an action, commenced in the
state court, to the federal court, it is clear-that the variance in
result will be very likely to encourage forum shopping. Under
these circumstances, state law, if not outweighed by a countervailing federal interest, will be applied.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,56 unlike Sibbach, presented an
action in which forum shopping definitely was involved. York
brought an action against Guaranty Trust for breach of trust.
The cause of action was barred by the state statute of limitations but was not necessarily barred, at the time of filing, by the
federal equitable laches rule. Whether the result of the two
rules would affect the outcome would depend upon how the federal judge chose to exercise his discretion. If he barred the suit,
the conflict would not exist. On the other hand, if he did not
bar the suit, the conflict would result in a significant variance
in the outcome. Where a suit barred in the state court is allowed in the federal system it is evident that forum shopping
will be encouraged. Thus, where, as here, there is no outweighing countervailing federal interest, state law should apply.
The conflict in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Co-operative,
Inc.5 7 was over who the trier of fact was to be. The state rule
provided for the judge to make fact determinations in a workmen's compensation case; the federal rule left such determinations to the jury. If it is first assumed that judge and jury trying an issue of fact would arrive at the same result, the first
factor in Seaboard fails, and the federal rule is applied. In fact,
however, a judge and jury trying a factual issue may or may not
reach the same result. Next, assuming that a different result
will obtain, the first factor in Seaboard is present. Such a variance in result is likely to, and indeed in practice does, encourage
forum shopping. Although the first two factors are present, a
FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
56 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
57 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
55
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strong federal policy, the seventh amendment, outweighs these
factors and requires application of the federal rule.
A similar application of the Seaboard factors to Hanna v.
Plumer58 shows that, since it is unlikely that the result would
be affected by choice of rule or that forum shopping would,
thereby, be encouraged, the federal rule should apply.
The Seaboard case is commendable for introducing some
consistent reasoning in a confused area, although like the cases
it-reviewed, it left certain questions unresolved. the court did
not discuss whether in choosing the applicable rule, a federal
decisional procedural rule wasto be considered as valid a federal
interest as a legislative procedural rule. Although York and
Seaboard implicitly treat a decisional procedural rule and a legislative procedural rule as identical, the opinions provide no express basis for equating the two. One possible basis for this
identity looks to the standard by which the initial validity of the
rule, as a federal procedural rule, is measured. The validity of
a legislative procedural rule is measured by the prohibition of
the Rules Enabling Act against infringement of substantive state
rights. It would seem to follow that decisional procedural rules
must be measured by this same standard. Expressed differently,
the constitutional grant of power to the legislature (to make federal procedural rules) and the legislative grant of power to the
judiciary (creation by legislature of the courts) are only one
step apart. Thus the same result follows from either - the
procedural rule may not infringe upon an area reserved to the
states.
Nor have the cases discussed the fact that, where the federal rule vests discretion in the district judge, and its exercise
in a certain manner would harmonize the state and federal rules,
upon such exercise, choice of the federal rule creates no problem
under Erie and its progeny.
The Erie case itself really has little application to its progeny or to the Seaboard case. The question posed by Erie was
the definition of the word "laws" for purposes of the Rules of
Decision Act and the Constitution. 59 The "progeny" and the
Seaboard case pose the choice between a state and a federal procedural rule in a diversity action when the choice of the latter
purportedly impairs a substantive state right. The real question
is the proper balance between the federal interest to be furthered
by application of the federal procedural rule and the impairment
of the state substantive right by such application. This balance,
which is a constant, constitutional question, demands express
58380 U.S. 460 (1965).
59 See text at notes 17-23 supra.
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recognition of the state's interests.6 0 This interest, although it
may be implicitly recognized in the first factor discussed in the
Seaboard case, i.e. the effect on the outcome of the litigation, is
often neglected or even ignored in making the balance, due to
the decisive importance given to whether forum shopping is thus
encouraged.
A suggested approach to resolve the problem of choice between state and federal procedural rules is to first determine
whether there is a literal conflict between the rules and whether
upon application, this conflict will remain or disappear. If the
conflict remains, a qualitative balance between the respective
state and federal interests underlying the rules must be made.
Such a balance would assure full recognition of the distribution
of power between the state and federal governments.
If the interest behind both the state and federal rules is
housekeeping, then the federal court will apply its own housekeeping rule. Where, however, there is a strong federal interest
behind the federal rule an even greater reason for choosing that
rule over a state housekeeping rule exists. Thus, where housekeeping is the interest behind the state rule, then without further
analysis, the federal rule applies. If on the other hand, the interest underlying the state rule is more substantive than housekeeping, two possibilities must be considered. First, if the interest behind the federal rule is housekeeping, state law should
apply. However, if the interest behind the federal rule is also
something more substantive than housekeeping, a balance must
be made between the respective state and federal interests.
For example, in the Sibbach case the initial conflict was
between a state rule forbidding physical examinations and a
federal rule permitting them within the court's discretion. The
literal conflict is obvious; but whether, upon application, the conflict will remain is unknown until the judge exercises his discretion. If the rules remain in conflict both literally and upon
application, then the state interest in the privacy of the individual and the federal interest in a "speedy and exact determination"6' 1 must be balanced. Under this analysis the federal rule
would prevail because the above federal interest expressed in its
broad discovery procedures is greater than the state substantive
interest.
60 And it [Erie] recognized that the scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal
legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can
make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard. Thus, in diversity cases

Erie commands that it be the state law governing primary private activity which prevails.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965)

61 312 U.S. at 14.

(concurring opinion).
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In York, the conflict was between the state statute of limitations and the federal rule of laches which gave the district
judge discretion in determining whether a definite lapse of time
constituted a bar to a suit. If the conflict remains after exercise of this discretion a balance of the respective state and federal interests must be made. If the interest behind the state
rule was to put an end to litigation, i.e. housekeeping, the federal rule should be applied. If, on the other hand, the interest
for the state rule is more substantive than housekeeping, e.g. to
terminate the defendant's risk of litigation, two remaining possibilities must be considered. If the interest for the federal rule
is to end litigation, i.e. housekeeping, the state rule will apply.
However, if the interest behind the federal rule is, like the state
interest, terminating the defendant's risk of litigation, the two
interests must be qualitatively balanced. In situations such as
this where the balance of the two interests are the same, the
state rule should be applied.
The conflict presented in Byrd is equally as complex. There
the choice was over who would determine an issue of fact. While
it is clear that a literal conflict was present, whether this will
be resolved upon application cannot be determined until the results are compared. If they (the judge and jury) arrive at the
same conclusion the issue is mooted. Assuming, however, that
their results would differ, reference must be made to the underlying interests to determine which rule to apply. There are
multiple interests at work: first, the interest common to both
systems, that of the allocation of the fact-finding function between the judge and jury; second, the federal interest expressed
in the seventh amendment right to a jury trial; and, third, the
fact that workmen's compensation is peculiarly an area of state
interest. Since the state interest in workmen's compensation is
more substantive than housekeeping and the federal interest, the
seventh amendment, is also non-housekeeping, the two must be
balanced.
A new problem arises at this point. When the balance of
interests is required, there is no difficulty in situations where
more than one interest factor exists for either or both rules.
The various factors are merely weighed cumulatively on their
respective sides. However, where as here, there is an interest
common to both rules, a different approach is taken. The common policy interest is independently treated using the suggested
analysis - an independent determination of the rule to be applied is made. This factor is then added to that side as an independent weight factor. Here, for example, the common interest, allocation of fact finding, if classified under both state and
federal rules as housekeeping, the federal rule therefore apply-
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ing, would be a policy tipping the scale to the federal side. In
Byrd, the federal interest - the seventh amendment -' would
be enough alone to outweigh the state interest; however a complete balance would, to be accurate, include the common factor
as added weight on the federal side.
In Hanna, the conflict between the state rule and the federal
rule was literal. Upon application of the two different rules
the conflict would remain. The interest behind both the state
and federal rules was twofold, first, actual notice of the action
and, second, a housekeeping reason, the manner of service. Balancing the strong interests of actual notice, qualitative equals,
dictates state law, while balancing the similar housekeeping interests dictates application of federal law. Since the interests
of actual notice are equal and the interests in manner of service
are not, the balance is tipped in favor of the federal rule., However, if the state's interest in actual notice is conceived to be
greater than that of the similar federal interest, the balance may
well be tipped in favor of the state rule.
In the Seaboard case the initial conflict was between .the
state rule requiring dismissal and the federal rule. giving the
court discretion in determining the dismissal. 62 If upon the
exercise of discretion the conflict remains, consideration must
be given to the interests behind the two rules. The reasons for
both the federal and state rule are twofold - first, 'to terminate
the defendant's risk of litigation and, second, to avoid the backlog, essentially a matter of judicial administration or housekeeping. The balancing -of the two non-housekeeping interests is a
factor weighing towards application of the state law while balancing of the two housekeeping interests weighs toward the application of the federal. law since the state has little if any interest in a backlog in the federal court. The choice of rule thus
depends upon whether the major interest was the housekeeping
or the non-housekeeping interest. Here the'major
interest of
the rule being to terminate the defendant's risk of litigation, the
state law should apply.63
CONCLUSION

The analysis of the. Seaboard court, showed an awareness
of some of the problems plaguing Erie's "progeny." ... The three
factors suggested by the court were indeed considerations. However, if the suggested analysis 'of looking to. see if the conflict
62 It
is assumed that a stay or abatement operates in the same manier
as dismissal.
63 If the enactment of a statute requiring a mandatory
dismissal in
'abrogation of the common law indicates an interest of greater weight than
the decisional rule permitting discretionary disposition, then the state rule
should be applied.
'.
'
"
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remains upon application of the differing rules and then balancing the policy interests behind the respective rules is used,
perhaps a clearer recognition of the vital federal-state interests
will be achieved and the constitutional limitations more easily
understood.
James P. Weissenborn

